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failure by auditors to adequately detect 
and warn of accounting irregularities 
and bankruptcies." 
The authors have concluded that the 
information presented in the Weiss 
research does not support the report's 
conclusion, and could have invalidly 
supported certain parts of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act. 
The Weiss Report 
The Weiss Report, submitted to the 
U.S. Senate, made the following obser-
vations: 
[Flor shareholders seeking protection, 
Wall Street research analysts are mere-
ly the second line of defense. The first 
line of defense is manned by public 
auditors, the subject of this paper .... 
Herein, we examine auditing firms in 
two closely related areas: (a) in terms 
of their performance in warning the 
public of accounting irregularities; 
and (b) in terms of their performance 
in warning of bankruptcies. 
The Weiss Report concluded that 
"The data demonstrate a broad and 
massive failure by auditors to adequate-
ly detect and warn of accounting irreg-
ularities and bankruptcies as the first 
line of defense against precisely such 
problems." This conclusion was based 
upon the number of "yellow flags" that 
selected bankrupt companies had with 
SAS 59 REQUIREMENTS 
respect to their financial condition. The 
reader is led to believe that the Weiss 
model (two out of seven yellow flags) is 
a reliable and widely accepted method 
for anticipating bankruptcy. 
SAS 59 
Statement on Auditing Standards 
(SAS) 59, The Auditor's Consideration 
of an Entity's Ability to Continue as a 
Going Concern, was issued over a 
decade ago in response to increasing 
concerns about whether auditors had 
been taking sufficient responsibility for 
evaluating a client's ability to continue 
as a going concern. Since the issuance 
of SAS 59, auditors have sought guid-
ance in making going-concern deci-
sions (see the Sidebar). 
SAS 59 states that the auditor has a 
responsibility to evaluate whether there 
is substantial doubt about an entity's 
ability to continue as a going concern 
for a period not to exceed one year from 
the date of the financial statements 
being audited. Auditors are not responsi-
ble for predicting future events or condi-
tions. Weiss implies and assumes that 
the auditors failed because a going-con-
cern report was not issued for selected 
companies that later went bankrupt. SAS 
59 notes "[thatJ an entity may cease to 
exist as a going concern subsequent to 
receiving a report from the auditor 
• An auditor's responsibility to evaluate whether an entity is a going con-
cern is for a period not to exceed one year from the date of the audited finan-
cial statements. 
• Auditors are not responsible for predicting future events. 
• The subsequent bankruptcy by a company that did not receive a going-
concern report, even if it is within one year of the balance sheet date, does 
not necessarily mean inadequate performance by the auditor. 
• An auditor is not required to perform specillc procedures to determine if 
an entity is a going concern. Audit procedures for other audit objectives are 
considered sufficient. 
• An auditor is required to evaluate management's plans to mitigate condi-
tions and events that indicate there might be substantial doubt that an entity 
is a going concern. 
• If the auditor concludes there is substantial doubt, the auditor must con-
sider the impact on the financial statements and related disclosures, to deter-
mine the effect on the audit opinion. 
• There are specific documentation requirements associated with the 
assessment of an entity's ability to continue as a going concern. 0 
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[which] docs not refer to substantial 
doubt, even within one year following 
the date of the financial statements, docs 
not, in itself, indicate inadequate perfor-
mance by the auditor." The standard 
also states that the absence of such a ref-
erence to substantial doubt in the audit 
report should not be considered "pro-
viding assurance as to an entity's ability 
to continue as a going concern." 
An auditor is not required to design 
audit procedures solely for the purpose 
of determining whether there is substan-
tial doubt that an entity will continue as a 
going concern. Audit procedures 
designed for other audit objectives, such 
as analytical procedures and review of 
compliance with debt and loan 
covenants, are considered sut11cient. In 
performing these procedures, there are 
conditions and events that could indicate 
that there is substantial doubt an entity 
will continue as a going concern. Exam-
ples of such items listed in SAS 59 include 
negative trends (e.g., working capital 
deficiencies; negative cash flows from 
operations); indicators of financial diffi-
culties (e.g., def~llIlt on loan agreements); 
internal matters (e.g., labor difficulties); 
and external matters (e.g., legislation that 
might affect an entity's ability to operate). 
The Weiss Report notes that there 
was evidence of negative trends for all 
the bankrupt companies it examined. 
Although Weiss concludes that the 
existence of two yellow flags (negative 
ratios) out of seven is an indication of 
substantial doubt, there is nothing in 
SAS 59 or any other authoritative litera-
ture to support this contention. 
If the conditions or events identified 
in SAS 59 exist, the auditor is reqUired 
to evaluate management's plans for 
dealing with the impact of these items, 
such as: disposing of assets; borrowing 
money or restructuring debt; reducing 
or delaying expenditures; and increas-
ing ownership equity. If, after evaluat-
ing management's plans, the auditor 
concludes that there is substantial 
doubt an entity will continue as a going 
concern, the auditor must consider the 
impact on the fInancial statements and 
the appropriateness of the related dis-
closures. Under SAS 59, disclosures 
could include: conditions and events 
giving rise to the assessment of substan-
tial doubt about the entity'S ability to 
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continue as a going concern; the possible effect of such con-
ditions and events; management's evaluation of the signifi-
cance of those conditions and events; and mitigating factors. 
The Weiss Report fails to address the auditor's evaluation 
of management's plans, an aspect of the audit process that 
researchers have found difficult to model. If the auditor con-
cludes there is substantial doubt, an explanatory paragraph is 
added after the opinion paragraph. The phrase "substantial 
doubt about its ability to continue as a going concern," or 
something Similar, is used. Inadequate disclosure with 
respect to an entity's ability to continue as a going concern 
could result in a qualified or adverse opinion. An auditor'S 
responsibility is to render an opinion as to whether a compa-
ny's financial statements and related disclosures are fairly 
stated. Weiss does not indicate whether the financial state-
ment disclosures were examined to determine whether such 
disclosures adequately supported the opinion rendered. 
SAS 59 also requires an auditor to document the following 
items: the conditions or events that indicate a substantial 
doubt about an entity's ability to continue as a going con-
cern; the elements of management's plans that the auditor 
considered to be particularly significant to overcoming the 
adverse effects of the conditions; the auditing procedures 
performed and evidence obtained to evaluate management's 
plans; the auditor's conclusion as to whether substantial 
doubt about the entity's ability to continue as a going con-
cern is alleviated; and the auditor's conclusion as to whether 
an explanation in the auditor's report is necessary. 
Research Background 
The Weiss Report identified 307 companies that declared 
bankmptcy between January 1,2001, and June 30,2002, from 
which Weiss eliminated all companies that declared bankmpt-
cy more than a year after the date of the most recent financial 
statements (the SAS 59 time limitation). Weiss also eliminated 
all companies that did not receive a "clean bill of health," 
meaning an unqualified opinion with no mention of going-
concern problems. This left only 45 companies that went 
bankrupt after having received an unqualified audit report. 
In the study, seven financial ratios were computed based on 
the financial statements for the fiscal period immediately pre-
ceding the company's bankmptcy. These ratios were: 
• Cash flow from operations to total debt 
• Net working capital to total assets 
• Debt to equity 
• Return on equity 
• Current ratio 
• Net income to sales 
• Cash flow to current liabilities. 
Weiss indicated that auditors currently have only two choic-
es when issuing their audit reports: submit a clean bill of health 
(a "green light"), or raise going-concern issues (a "red flag"). 
Weiss recommended that an additional, intermediate level of 
warning be made available for public companies, and suggest-
ed language for this warning: "The company is currently stable 
but may sutfer tlnancial pressures if the business environment 
deteriorates within the next 12 months. This level of warning 
alerts shareholders and regulators but does not invoke SEC 
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actions." The label for this intermediate level is a "yellow flag." 
Using specific quantitative benclunarks for each of the seven 
ratios, Weiss counted the number of yellow flags for each of 
the companies and reported their frequency distribution. 
The Weiss research has numerous and important limitations: 
• The seven ratios used by Weiss were based on individual 
ratios that have not been proved to predict bankruptcies. In 
addition, the ratios appear to have been selected arbitrarily 
from several sources, with arbitrary cutoffs that are not 
accepted industry standards. Weiss cites three sources for 
choosing the ratios: a study by Mills and Yamamura (journal 
oj Accountancy, October 1998); the 1966 Beaver study; and 
a page reference in a 1974 text by Bernstein on financial 
statement analysis. First, the Mills and Yamamura article sug-
gests ratios that might be useful for auditors in forming their 
going-concern decisions. The article neither tests for nor 
proves any relationships between the ratios and bankruptcy. 
Second, the Beaver study does not use individual ratios; 
rather, it tests the predictive ability of a group of ratios. 
Third, the reference in the Bernstein text relates to bankrupt-
cy prediction studies by Altman. Altman's Bankruptcy Pre-
diction Model and the Koh methodology have been proved 
to reliably predict bankruptcies. Weiss did not use either of 
those models, however, which use a group of ratios collec-
tively to predict bankmptcy, not individual ratios as in Weiss. 
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• The Weiss Report covered only 
selected bankrupt companies. There 
was no comparison between bankrupt 
and nonbankrupt companies. Such an 
analysis would have provided evidence 
whether or not these ratios differentiate 
bankrupt from nonbankrupt companies. 
The authors examined 3,610 active 
nonbankrupt public companies as well 
as 97 bankrupt public companies in 
order to determine if the Weiss ratios 
could accurately predict bankruptcy. 
Unlike Weiss, which included only 
companies where the auditors did not 
The flaws of the Weiss Report 
suggest that the study cannot be relied upon as an 
indicator of the success or failure of auditing firms to 
predict the bankruptcy of a company. 
• Weiss asserted that the seven finan-
cial ratios used in the study are "com-
monly used by auditors to help flag diffi-
culties." There is no empirical evidence, 
however, that auditors use these ratios 
for that purpose. Nor is there evidence 
that these individual ratios have been 
determined to be valid for predicting 
financial distress or bankruptcy. 
• The 45 companies selected went 
bankrupt without their auditors issuing 
a going-concern opinion. Weiss did not 
include the cases in which auditors had 
issued such an opinion. 
• The study did not include qualita-
tive measures, such as bond defaults or 
off-balance sheet financing, or profes-
sional judgment in auditors' decisions. 
These factors have to be integrated into 
the decision process. If predicting 
bankruptcies were as easy as comput-
ing seven basic ratios, then there would 
be no need for an auditor's professional 
judgment. 
Testing the Conclusions 
To determine if the seven Weiss crite-
ria could predict bankruptcy, the 
authors applied them to a sample of 
nonbankrupt companies. The intention 
was not to analyze the Weiss Report, 
but merely to apply its ratios and yellow 
flags. The results may prove unsettling 
to the accounting profession and, possi-
bly, to some members of Congress. 
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correctly predict the bankruptcy, this 
survey included all public companies 
filing for bankruptcy in 2000 that had 
filed a lO-K in the previous two years. 
Weiss' Appendix A fully documented 
the criteria for the seven ratios. The 
authors drew active nonbankrupt com-
panies from Compustat, using 2000 and 
2001 annual financial data, exactly as 
Weiss had done, in order to compute the 
number of yellow flags for each ratio. 
From these results, the authors deter-
mined that the Weiss criteria (two yel-
low flags) would have predicted that 
46.9% of nonbankrupt companies 
should have received a going-concern 
opinion due to potential financial failure. 
In other words, the Weiss criteria would 
have incorrectly predicted bankruptcy 
for 1,693 companies. Just as a correct 
prediction of bankruptcy is desirable, an 
incorrect prediction of bankruptcy has 
negative consequences for the company, 
its auditor, and its shareholders. Taken to 
the extreme, the most foolproof way to 
predict all bankruptcies is to predict that 
all companies will go bankrupt, ignoring 
the significant number of incorrect pre-
dictions in the process. The Weiss 
research ignores the risk of incorrect 
predictions of bankruptcy. 
The Weiss Report's conclusion of "a 
broad and massive failure by auditors to 
adequately detect and warn of account-
ing irregularities and bankruptcies," 
cannot be taken lightly. It is reasonable 
to assume that Weiss affected the view 
of the U.S. senators and other parties 
that read the study. Weiss proposed 
seven measures, three of which relate 
to consulting services. The Sarbanes-
Oxley Act has specific provisions that 
restrict consulting work that auditors 
can provide for their clients. 
Studies offered in support of federal 
legislation should be conducted using 
proper criteria and research methodolo-
gy. New legislation or audit regulations 
should not be an overreaction to highly 
publicized cases (e.g., Enron and World-
Com) unless these are indicative of a sys-
temic problem. In addition, conclusions 
should be based on the data and use 
appropriate statistical tests. The flaws of 
the Weiss Report-inadequate sample 
selection; the use of criteria not proved 
to predict bankruptcy; and the lack of 
statistical support-suggest that the 
study cannot be relied upon as an indi-
cator of the success or failure of auditing 
firms to predict the bankruptcy or the 
going-concern status of a company. If 
Weiss' standard of two yellow flags were 
applied to all companies, auditors would 
be predicting that almost half of their 
clients would go bankrupt. 
The Weiss conclusions represent a 
widening of the gap between expecta-
tions of auditors' responsibilities and 
the responsibilities auditors actually 
assume. Because of this expectations 
gap, the public often assumes that an 
auditor has failed to perform adequate-
ly. The unfortunate repercussions of 
studies like Weiss, which in fact 
spurred new laws and regulations, lead 
to increased costs of audit compliance 
without delivering any improvement in 
the prediction of bankruptcies. 0 
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